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Abstract: This article traces the origins of the European economic constitution in the 
debate on Article 30 of the EC Treaty (general rule on the free movement of goods) 
between 1966 and 1969, which resulted in Directive 70/50. In this, the first archive-
based analysis of the policy origins of the Court’s Dassonville (1974) decision, the 
article demonstrates that there was a strong continuity in the investment by a number 
of key actors in focusing on Article 30 to create the single market from the mid-
1960s. These civil servants and lawyers provided the backbone for the Commission’s 
transformation of the Cassis de Dijon judgment (1979) into a powerful tool, driving 
back the need for legislative harmonisation and making it a cornerstone of the Single 
European Act of 1986. The article therefore analyses one of the key moments in the 
transformation of European law. 
[141 words] 
I Introduction 
This article is the first archive-based work focusing on the policy origins of the 
European ‘economic constitution’ to provide an initial building block for a more 
comprehensive reassessment of the role of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in 
paving the way for the launch of the single market program.1 This issue has been 
examined by legal and social science literature, which has claimed that the Court’s 
case law, giving effect to the common market provisions of the European Community 
(EC) Treaty was instrumental to the breakthrough of the Single European Act (1986).2 
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1 Two articles in preparation for publication deal with: the move from 
Dassonville to Cassis de Dijon; and the Commission’s transformation of the Cassis de 
Dijon judgement and the reception of the decision in the Member States.  
2 M. Maduro, We the Court. The European Court of Justice and the European
Economic Constitution (Hart, 1998); A. Stone Sweet, The Judicial Construction of 
Europe (Oxford University Press, 2004), esp. chapter 3, ‘Free movement of goods’ 
(with Margaret McCown), 109-145. 
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The argument that the Court played a central role in the launch of the single market 
program by developing the European economic constitution builds on the notion of 
the constitutionalisation of EC law. Accordingly, the ECJ constitutionalised the 
Treaty in a number of milestone judgements from the early 1960s through the 
doctrines of direct effect and supremacy. Direct effect recognizes that the provisions 
of the EC Treaty could enjoy positive legal force directly in national law, if they met 
certain conditions. Later ECJ judgements also extended this provision to certain 
secondary rules. Supremacy, in turn, recognizes that EC law is the ‘supreme law of 
the land’. Legal and social science scholarship has argued that this process has been 
informed by the ‘constitutional paradigm’.3 However, only the case law on the 
common market in goods in particular, gave life to the constitutional paradigm. In the 
words of Joseph Weiler: ‘The common market, the heart of the material or substantive 
constitution of the Community, was in large measure judicially ‘constituted’…’4 
Through a progressive interpretation of Article 30-36 on the free movement of goods 
the Court initiated a move towards deregulation and thereby directly intervened in the 
legal spheres of the Member States.  
In this narrative Dassonville (1974)5 and Cassis de Dijon (1979) 6 were two of 
a series of landmark cases that facilitated the development of the European economic 
constitution. In Dassonville, the ECJ for the first time defined the ‘measures having 
equivalent effect to quantitative restrictions’ of Article 30 of the EC Treaty.7 
Crucially, the Treaty itself had not provided a definition of measures having 
equivalent effect to quantitative restrictions. Measures included a variety of rules. To 
give only two examples, measures ranged from rules on the consumption of 
domestically produced (or ‘national’) goods – a case in point would be ‘buy British, 
                                                             
3  Recent historical research has proposed referring to the ‘constitutional 
practice’ of the Court. M. Rasmussen and B. Davies, ‘Towards a New History of 
European Law’, (2012) 21 Contemporary European History, 305-318, here 306. 
4  J.H.H. Weiler, ‘The Constitution of the Common Market Place: Text and 
Context in the Free Movement of Goods’, in: P. Craig and G. de Búrca (eds.), The 
Evolution of EU Law (Oxford University Press, 1999), 349-376, here 350. 
5  Case 8/74 Procureur de Roi v Benoît et Gustave Dassonville; et SA Ets 
Fourcroy et SA Breuval et Cie v Benoît et Gustave Dassonville 
6  Case 120/78 Rewe Zentral AG v Bundesmonopolverwaltung f. Branntwein. 
7  ‘Quantitative restrictions on imports and all measures having equivalent effect 
shall, without prejudice to the following provisions, be prohibited between Member 
States.’ 
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or German, or French’ clauses – to rules rendering the sale or use of imported goods 
more burdensome than the sale or use of domestic products. The definition of 
measures having equivalent effect the Court provided in Dassonville was 
spectacularly wide. Following the argument of the European economic constitution 
Dassonville served as the foundation, but it was Cassis de Dijon that made the broad 
‘Dassonville formula’ manageable.8  
Cassis de Dijon has been hailed ‘a milestone in the jurisprudence’9 of the 
Court and has become its most frequently cited decision in the leading textbooks on 
EC law.10 The 1979 judgment served as the point of departure for the doctrine of 
mutual recognition, according to which goods complying with technical requirements 
in one Member State could be marketed and sold without restrictions in any other 
Member State.11 Moreover, following Cassis de Dijon, Member States could only 
prevent the circulation of goods from other member states when they were able to 
demonstrate this was necessary for the protection of either public health or 
consumers. Cassis de Dijon therefore provided an important new tool in the creation 
of the common market and an alternative to legislative harmonisation – the strategy 
pursued with only limited success by the European Commission. 12 Notably, Member 
State governments also resorted to protectionist measures to respond to the world 
economic crises from 1973-74. Subsidies and administrative regulations were enacted 
                                                             
8  Weiler, Constitution of the Common Market Place, 458-459. 
9  T. Carney, ‘What Rule of Reason? Cassis de Dijon (1979): A Flawed Locus 
Classicus?’, in: E. O’Dell (ed.), Leading Cases of the Twentieth Century (Round Hall 
Sweet & Maxwell, 2000), 310-326, here 310. 
10  M. Derlén and J. Lindholm, ‘Goodbye van Gend en Loos, Hello Bosman? 
Using Network Analysis to Measure the Importance of Individual CJEU Judgments’, 
(2014) 20 European Law Journal 667-687, here 670.  
11  Joseph Weiler has promoted using the more accurate concept of ‘functional 
parallelism’ instead of ‘mutual recognition’, following the British lawyer Alan 
Dashwood. Since mutual recognition has dominated the literature, however, this 
article will continue using it. See, Weiler, Constitution of the Common Market Place, 
365-367. Cf. also N. Bernard, ‘Flexibility in the European Single Market’, in: J. Scott 
and C. Barnard, The Law of the Single Market: Unpacking the Premises (Hart, 2002), 
101-122, here 104-105. 
12  The Commission’s approach to common market building was hampered by 
the unanimity requirement regarding common market issues and only 270 directives 
and laws were harmonised in lengthy negotiations between the Commission and 
Member State governments between 1969 and 1985. M. Egan, ‘The single market’, 
in: M. Cini (ed.) European Union Politics (Oxford University Press, 2003), 28-45, 
here 32. See also M. Egan, Constructing a European Market. Standards, Regulation, 
and Governance (Oxford University Press, 2003). 
 4 
 
and voluntary restraints encouraged by the Member States to protect national 
economies, while effectively creating new non-tariff barriers to trade between the 
Six.13  
This article approaches the European economic constitution by focusing on 
the policy origins of the Court’s jurisprudence. The European Commission addressed 
the measures having equivalent effect to quantitative restrictions in a directive, which 
was adopted on 22 December 1969 and published as Directive 70/50/EEC on 19 
January 1970.14 The article evaluates for first time the historical sources from the 
Archives of the European Commission on the development of Directive 70/50. This 
archive-based approach brings to the fore the individual and collective actors who 
created the legal foundations of the jurisprudence of the Court. The article will show 
that there was a strong continuity in the investment by a number of key actors in 
focusing on Article 30 to create the single market from the mid-1960s. This small 
group of civil servants and lawyers provided the backbone for the Commission’s 
transformation of the 1979 judgment into a powerful tool driving back the need for 
legislative harmonisation and making it a cornerstone of the Single European Act of 
1986. This archive- and actor-based approach highlights, moreover, that key elements 
of the Court’s ‘Cassis jurisprudence’ were developed in the deliberations on the 
Commission directive.  
The article will proceed by elaborating briefly on the broader question of the 
role of the Court in the launch of the single market program (II), which will be 
resumed in the conclusions (IV). The legal foundations of Dassonville and Cassis de 
Dijon will be introduced in an empirical section dealing with the stages in the 
evolution of Directive 70/50 (III).  
 
II  A European economic constitution? 
In recent years archive-based historical research has recast the narrative of the 
constitutionalisation of the EC Treaty by the Court. This research has highlighted the 
role of judges and lawyers with strong activist European integrationist credentials in 
generating the landmark decisions of the early 1960s, on the one hand, and has 
                                                             
13  E. Bussière, ‘Devising a Strategy: The Internal Market and Industrial Policy’, 
in: Michel Dumoulin (ed.), The European Commission, 1973-1986. History and 
Memories of an Institution (Publications Office of the European Union, 2014), 263-
276, here 268-269. 
14  Official Journal of the European Communities, 19.1.70, No L 13/29.  
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provided a nuanced picture of the ‘reception’ of the ECJ case law in the Member 
States, on the other, stressing the contestation and sometimes disregard of landmark 
decisions.15 This article will contribute to this research agenda by: (a) applying the 
archive-based historical approach for the first time to the substantive constitution of 
the Community; and (b) assessing for the first time the individual and collective 
agency behind the policy origins of Dassonville and Cassis de Dijon as cornerstones 
of the European economic constitution.  
 Historical research allows us to draw an important connection between the 
constitutional reading of EC law and the economic constitution. The Italian judge 
Alberto Trabucchi who played a key role in the Van Gend en Loos decision, as 
historian Morten Rasmussen has demonstrated,16 crucially was the Advocate-General 
in Dassonville. An expert in civil law and comparative private law and a career 
academic before he joined the ECJ in 1962, Trabucchi argued forcefully for the direct 
effect of Article 12 in the deliberations on Van Gend en Loos. The behind-the-scenes 
account of the debate within the panel of judges is in part based on a memorandum 
Trabucchi wrote at the time. Unfortunately, no equivalent documentary evidence 
exists for the Dassonville case and we are left with the opinion Trabucchi presented to 
the Court in 1974.17 But given that as a judge the Italian promoted an understanding 
of European law as different from traditional international public law, it is likely that 
Trabucchi was keen to pursue this approach to the Treaty’s economic freedoms, too. 
This article reconstructs the making of Directive 70/50 to reveal further personal 
connections between the Court and Commission, between jurisprudential 
development and policy debates, from the mid-1960s to the 1970s.  
Although this is the first archive-based work addressing the policy foundations 
of the European economic constitution, the claim that the Court’s case law gave effect 
                                                             
15  See, Bill Davies’ pioneering: Resisting the European Court of Justice. West 
Germany’s Confrontation with European Law, 1949-1979 (Cambridge University 
Press, 2012); M. Rasmussen and B. Davies, Towards a New History of European Law 
(supra note 3); and M. Rasmussen, ‘Establishing a Constitutional Practise of 
European Law: The History of the Legal Service of the European Executive, 1952-
1965’, (2012) 21 Contemporary European History, 237-397. 
16  M. Rasmussen, ‘Revolutionizing European law: a history of the Van Gend en 
Loos judgment’, (2014) 12 International Journal of Constitutional Law, 136-163, 
here 153-154. 
17  Case 8/74, Opinion of Mr Advocate-General Trabucchi, delivered on 20 June 
1974, 864-65.  
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to the EC Treaty’s common market provisions and was crucial to the breakthrough of 
1986 has been contested. Weiler himself has emphasised the limited impact of the 
mutual recognition doctrine on market liberalisation, and has referred to it as 
‘perhaps, an intellectual breakthrough but a colossal market failure’18 without 
however softening the overall interpretation of the power of the Court in creating a 
European constitution. In other words acknowledging the limited contribution of 
Cassis de Dijon to market liberalisation has not diminished its appraisal as: (a) a 
source providing for political impetus towards the Single European Act; and (b) an 
element of the legal argument about the constitutionalisation of the common market. 
Moreover, in a seminal article in 1994 Karen Alter and Sophie Meunier have 
qualified the role of the ECJ in this process from a political science perspective. The 
authors highlight that the Court’s decision did not establish new doctrinal ground. 
Instead they argue that the Cassis de Dijon judgment provided an important tool for 
the activist European Commission to introduce their ‘new approach to 
harmonization’.19 Crucially however, policy consequences were only created, and 
market liberalisation facilitated, when societal interest groups began mobilizing the 
Commission’s new approach. Alter and Meunier argue that from the early 1980s, 
consumer groups in particular began lobbying the newly elected governments in 
Britain (1979), Germany (1982) and France (following its departure from the socialist 
programme, 1981-83). These governments championed neoliberal policy preferences 
and were open to using the EC to advance these preferences. As a result they were 
more receptive to the Commission’s bold reading of the Cassis de Dijon decision. 
According to Alter and Meunier, the ECJ introduced the concept of mutual 
recognition into the European debate and therefore acted as ‘a catalyst’ and ‘a 
provocateur’.20  
Furthermore, Nick Bernhard has cast doubt on the European economic 
constitution in a contribution to a volume on the fiftieth anniversary of the Treaty of 
Rome. Focusing on the move from Dassonville to Cassis de Dijon, Bernard argues 
that legal scholarship has scrutinised the legal origins of Cassis de Dijon – the Treaty 
                                                             
18  Weiler, Constitution of the Common Market Place, 368. 
19  K. Alter and S. Meunier-Aitsahalia, ‘Judicial Politics in the European 
Community. European Integration and the Path-Breaking Cassis de Dijon Decision’, 
(1994) 26 Comparative Political Studies, 535-561. 
20 Ibid.  
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provisions (Articles 30-36); secondary legislation (especially Commission Directive 
70/50); the jurisprudential origins (case law); and the doctrinal development (case law 
and legal commentary) – but has not sufficiently considered its contextual origins. 
This distinction is vital because a purely legal reading of the evolution of Cassis de 
Dijon fails to include important contextual dimensions of the evolution of the 
judgment including in particular legislative harmonisation, trade liberalisation, and 
market creation.21 A contextual perspective on the relationship between the two 
landmark cases shows that the legal problem in Dassonville could not have been 
resolved by means of harmonisation. This is important; for if harmonisation would 
not have resolved the issue at stake in Dassonville, it makes no sense to suggest that 
the Court stepped in to improve on the painful process of legal harmonisation by 
handing down this decision in 1974. But this is precisely the role ascribed to the ECJ 
in the narrative of the constitutionalisation of the common market provisions as 
proposed by Weiler.22  
Building on the important distinction into the legal and contextual origins of 
the Court’s case law, the following section will introduce the individual and collective 
actors involved in the making of Directive 70/50. It will also scrutinise to which 
extent these actors continued to be involved in the debate on Article 30, specifically in 
the ECJ’s Dassonville and Cassis de Dijon decisions. At the same time, the section 
will trace the policy development and the evolution of the directive.   
 
III  The Commission takes a stand: Directive 70/50 
Archival records helped to identify three periods in the development of what was to 
become Directive 70/50. These three periods differed with regard to the intensity of 
the debate on the measures having equivalent effect to quantitative restrictions as well 
as on the types of questions discussed. While this provision did not take centre stage 
when the Treaty of Rome came into force in 1958, it became crucially important, and 
the debate intensified, towards the end of the transition period in 1970. From the end 
of the transition period, Article 30 would become immediately effective and the EC 
                                                             
21   N. Bernard, ‘On the Art of Not Mixing One's Drinks: Dassonville and Cassis 
de Dijon Revisited’, in: M. P. Maduro and L. Azoulai (eds.) The Past and Future of 
EU Law. The Classics of EU Law Revisited on the 50th Anniversary of the Rome 
Treaty (Hart, 2010), 456-464. 
22  Weiler, Constitution of the Common Market Place, 458-459. 
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Treaty would prohibit all measures having equivalent effect to quantitative 
restrictions unless they fell within the scope of Article 36. Article 36 enumerates 
specific exceptions from the principle of the free movement of goods.23 As they knew 
the end of the transition period was approaching, a number of actors in European 
institutions therefore began pushing for a clarification of the Treaty provision from 
1966.  
 
III.1 The establishment of an institutional framework for discussing Article 30  
(1958-1966) 
In 1958, when they began work on the elimination of quantitative restrictions, 
officials from the Commission’s Directorate-General (DG) III (Internal Market) and 
its Legal Service were already discussing the interpretation of the measures having 
equivalent effect with representatives of the Member States. Notably these 
Commission departments continued to provide the core platform for the exchange of 
views between legal experts beyond this initial time period and into the time of the 
landmark cases of the 1970s. It was decided in 1958 that a special working group 
would be established to develop the application of the Treaty provisions by means of 
directives (based on Article 33/7 EC).24 Only a few years later, in 1962, the 
Commission formalised work on the interpretation of the measures having equivalent 
effect and quite naturally, DG III was charged with taking the lead on this question. 
DG III then composed a report, which was pencilled onto the agenda of the 235th 
meeting of the Commission on 10 July 1963.25 As a result, from 1963, a special 
working group on quantitative restrictions and measures having equivalent effect 
                                                             
23  ‘The provisions of Articles 30 to 34 shall not preclude prohibitions or 
restrictions on imports, exports or goods in transit justified on grounds of public 
morality, public policy or public security; the protection of health and life of humans, 
animals or plants; the protection of national treasures possessing artistic historic or 
archaeological value; or the protection of industrial and commercial property. Such 
prohibitions or restrictions shall not, however, constitute a means of arbitrary 
discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade between Member States.’  
24  Réunion d’information sur l’élimination des restrictions quantitative, F 
1021/58, 22-23 September 1958, Archives of the European Commission, BAC 
173/1995 4041. 
25  Report, III/COM(63) 265, 9 July 1963, BAC 492/1995 7. 
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(from here onwards: special working group) composed of Commission officials and 
experts from the Member States met to discuss Article 30.26  
Two officials who represented the Legal Service of the Commission in the 
special working group need introducing here:27 first, René-Christian Béraud who 
became intimately associated with the drafting of Directive 70/50 in the contemporary 
legal literature.28 Béraud was mentored by and worked closely with Michel Gaudet,29 
the French lawyer and legendary first head of the Legal Service of the Commission 
and later, of the Joint Legal Service.30 Béraud was involved in all stages of the 
making of the Commission directive and would, moreover, represent the European 
Commission in the proceedings leading to the Dassonville judgment in 1974. Béraud 
therefore provides a vital link between policymaking in the Commission and the 
development of the jurisprudence of the Court.  
The second civil servant representing the Legal Service in the meetings of the 
special working group was Hubert Ehring. The German lawyer first joined the 
European Coal and Steel Community’s Legal Service of the Secretariat of the Special 
Council of Ministers in 1954. In 1956-57, he participated in the intergovernmental 
conference on the common market and Euratom.31 Ehring contributed to triggering 
and shaping the second stage of policymaking. In contrast to Béraud however his 
involvement did not go beyond the development of Directive 70/50. Ehring’s 
                                                             
26  Bericht, Sitzung der Arbeitsgruppe der Regierungssachverständigen für 
mengenmässige Beschränkungen und Massnahmen gleicher Wirkung, 14-15 February 
1963, 2858/III/63-D, 15 March 1963, BAC 173/1995 4052. 
27  See, for the participants of the working group, for example, Compte-Rendu, 
Group des experts pour les restrictions quantitatives et les mesures d’effet quivalent, 
de la reunion tenue le 15 juillet 1966, 12/086/III/66-F, 25 August 1966, BAC 
173/1995-4053. 
28  R.-C. Béraud, ‘Les mesures d’effet équivalent aus sens des articles 30 et 
suivants du Traité de Rome’, (1968) 1 Revue trimestrielle du droit Européen, 265-
292.  
29  For the relationship between Gaudet and Béraud, see, Alexandre Bernier, La 
France et le droit communautaire 1958-1981: Histoire d’une réception et d’une co-
production, Doctoral thesis in progress. 
30  M. Rasmussen, Establishing a Constitutional Practise (supra note 15); J. 
Bailleux, ‘Michel Gaudet, A Law Entrepreneur: The Role of the Legal Service of the 
European Executives in the Invention of EC Law and the Birth of the Common 
Market Law Review’, (2013) 50 Common Market Law Review, 359-367. 
31  Short biography of Hubert Ehring, retrieved from: 
http://www.cvce.eu/en/histoire-orale/unit-content/-/unit/d20058df-0c9b-4b6b-bb22-
bf9f06151aa6 
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authority in EC law was acknowledged by the young Italian official Alfonso Mattera 
Ricigliano, who referred to the German as the ‘legal conscience’32 of the first 
president of the European Commission, Walter Hallstein.  
Alfonso Mattera was a recent recruit to DG III, who had only started working 
for the Commission in the beginning of 1966,33 and was one of the representatives of 
DG III in the special working group. Mattera contributed to the drafting of Directive 
70/50. At the time of Dassonville, the Italian official was no longer a new civil 
servant but a recognised expert on the measures having equivalent effect. For 
example, Mattera prepared the first part of a working document regarding the 
measures having equivalent effect and Article 42 of the Act of Accession of the 
United Kingdom in 1974.34 Moreover, for the plaintiffs’ lawyer in the Dassonville 
case, Roger Strowel, a lawyer at the Court d’Appel at Brussels, Mattera became the 
key contact in the Commission in 1973.35 Mattera and Strowel not only met in person 
in April 1973,36 but, later in the same year, Strowel shared with the Court and with 
Mattera his conclusions regarding the preliminary reference to the Court.37 Further, 
Mattera assumed a prominent role in the aftermath of Cassis de Dijon in developing 
and promoting the Commission’s approach to the decision, which earned him the 
nickname of ‘Mr Cassis’ in Brussels circles.38 Mattera therefore provides further 
evidence for the connection between policymaking and jurisprudence, between 
Commission and Court.  
As regards the work on the measures having equivalent effect during the 
initial stage of policymaking, three directives were issued, one in 1964 and two in 
                                                             
32  A. Mattera, Notre européanité. Une Histoire millénaire, de l’épopée de 
Marathon à la réunification des peuples de l’Ancien Continent (LGDJ, 2014), 170. 
33  Curriculum vitae Alfonso Mattera, 31.1.2011, retrieved from: 
http://www.europeancollege.it/en-US/Alfonso-Mattera.aspx 
34  This document is part of a folder preparing a visit of a Commission delegation 
to London, in which Mattera participated. Document de travail, 19 February 1974, 
BAC 179/1991 133. 
35  http://avocats.be/fr/avocat/strowelroger; 
http://www.barreaudebruxelles.info/scripts-recherche/DetailsAnnuaire_n.php?ID=339 
36  For example, letter Roger Strowel to the President and Members of the 
Commission of the EEC, 3 April 1973, BAC 371/1991 1737 (p. 5). 
37  Letter Roger Strowel to Mattera, 10 December 1973, BAC 304/1993 34.  
38  L. Gormley, ‘Cassis de Dijon and the Communication from the Commission’, 
(1981) 6 European Law Review, 454-459, here 545, note 8. See also, A. Mattera 
Ricigliano, ‘L’arrêt «Cassis de Dijon»: une nouvelle approche pour la réalisation et le 
bon fonctionnement du marché intérieur’, (1980) Revue du marché commun, 505-513.  
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1966. But the main question facing the Commission remained unresolved, namely 
how to ensure that the Member States would comply with the obligations arising from 
Article 30 following the end of the transition period in 1970. From a legal point of 
view it would have been sufficient for the Commission to simply continue reminding 
the Member States of their obligations. However, the Commission decided to issue 
another directive addressing all remaining measures of equivalent effect.39  
In conclusion, the main achievement of the first period of work on Article 30 
was the formation of the special working group in the Commission. This group 
functioned as an important hub for the negotiations on the future Directive 70/50 in 
the second and third period of its evolution. Moreover, with René-Christian Béraud 
and Alfonso Mattera two key actors have been introduced who not only contributed to 
the legal debate and the making of Directive 70/50, but who were moreover linked to 
the Dassonville and/or Cassis de Dijon cases. In terms of the substance matter 
however the second period of policymaking was decisive.   
 
 
III.2 The intensification of the legal debate and its politicisation  
(1966-67) 
The debate on Article 30 intensified and changed in terms of the issues debated in 
1966-1967. The first of two developments triggering this change was a contribution 
by Hubert Ehring regarding the scope of the measures having equivalent effect. The 
German official raised the question if measures having equivalent effect would 
include non-discriminatory trade regulations, i.e. trade regulations applicable in the 
same way to domestic and imported products, as long as these regulations pursued 
legitimate objectives that fell within the competence of the state.40 What Ehring 
queried was if the Treaty in fact prohibited all measures interfering with intra-
Community trade. If this were the case, the free movement of goods between the 
Member States would be regarded as more important than their respective regulatory 
competences. Such a wide interpretation, or extensive reading, of Article 30 
represented an opportunity to advance European market integration.  
                                                             
39  Vorbereitung der Dokumente, ca. November 1969, BAC 138/1992 274.   
40  Interview with Alfonso Mattera, Collection: The European Commission 1958-
1972. Memories of an institution, 25 November 2004, Retrieved from: 
http://archives.eui.eu/en/oral_history/INT773, 15.  
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Ehring’s input was significant for two reasons. First, it generated the 
formation of another, more informal reflection group on the measures having 
equivalent effect. Second, Ehring’s question introduced the important distinction into: 
(a) measures differentiating between domestic and imported products (also referred to 
as distinctly applicable measures); and (b) measures equally applicable to domestic 
and imported products (or indistinctly applicable measures) into the debate. This 
distinction shaped the discussions on Article 30 in 1966-67 and it structured the future 
Directive 70/50.  
 The informal reflection group on the measures having equivalent effect is 
based on the recollections of Alfonso Mattera. The Italian official recalls his surprise 
when the reflection group of the ‘leading authorities of the emerging legal 
community’ charged him and a German colleague with formulating the Commission’s 
action plan following the transition period.41 The young Commission officials were to 
base their work on the deliberations of this group, which included, among others: 
Michel Gaudet; Hubert Ehring; Director-General for the Internal Market, Robert 
Toulemon; Director-General for Competition Pieter VerLoren van Theemat; and 
Béraud.42 It has not been possible to locate written records pertaining to the reflection 
group. However, its composition, which included Béraud, Ehring and Mattera, 
suggests a significant overlap with the institutionalised special working group. And 
while it is unlikely that high-ranking Commission officials like Gaudet, Toulemon 
and VerLoren van Theemat regularly participated in the special working group 
meetings, it is likely they met informally in the reflection group to discuss the scope 
of the measures having equivalent effect.  
 Pieter VerLoren van Theemat’s contribution to the debate is well known and 
matches his strong pro-European beliefs. VerLoren van Theemat had been involved in 
the European project from the days of the interstate conference on the Schuman Plan 
(1950-51), when he advised the Dutch delegation, and became the first Director 
General of DG IV (Competition) (1958-1967). In 1967, the future Advocate-General 
at the European Court of Justice (1981-86)43 joined the University of Utrecht where 
he also supervised doctoral dissertations on the economic law of the EC, including, 
for example, Pieter Jan Slot’s thesis on Technical and administrative obstacles to 
                                                             
41   Mattera, Notre européanité. 172.  
42  Ibid.  
43  http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/Jo2_9606/anciens-membres  
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trade in the EEC, which included a comparison of the EC and the construction of the 
US single market, in particular the ‘commerce clause’ of the US constitution.44 As 
regards the scope of Article 30 VerLoren van Theemat argued that all state measures 
with the potential to hinder trade between the Member States should be considered as 
measures having equivalent effect to quantitative restrictions. Notably, this would 
include measures not differentiating between domestic and imported products 
(indistinctly applicable measures). Measures enacted by the Member States therefore 
could only be upheld when they came within the scope of Article 36. In short, for 
VerLoren van Theemat the discussions on Article 30 presented a chance to push for 
more European integration.45  
 Michel Gaudet’s involvement in the debate is not well-known. Unlike 
VerLoren van Theemat, Gaudet did not contribute to the discussion on Article 30 in 
the law journals. But as the head of the Legal Service, he was at all times kept in the 
loop about the debate on the measures having equivalent effect. Gaudet even 
discussed the issue in a written response to a questionnaire on ‘non-tariff 
discrimination on the international movement of goods’ by the London-based 
International Law Association in early 1966.46  
In summary, by 1966, the debate on Article 30 was in full swing, in the 
reflection group and beyond. The push for the Commission to take a firm stand on the 
measures having equivalent effect however originated from outside of its own 
departments. The crucial second development responsible for the change of the debate 
characterizing the second period of policymaking on the future Directive 70/50 was a 
written question by the German Member of the European Parliament (MEP) and 
rapporteur of the EP Internal Market Committee, Arved Deringer, on 8 December 
1966. If Hubert Ehring’s query had intensified the legal debate on Article 30, 
Deringer’s written question now politicised this debate.  
                                                             
44  Pieter Jan Slot, Technical and administrative obstacles to trade in the EEC. 
Including a comparison with interstate trade barriers in the USA, PhD dissertation 
Utrecht, Sijthoff, Leyden/T.M.C. Asser Instituut, Den Haag, 1975; see, chapter 7, 
125-146.  
45  P. VerLoren van Theemat, ‘Bevat art. 30 van het EEG-Verdrag slechts een 
non-discriminatiebeginsel ten aanzien van invoerbeperkingen’, (1967) 15 Sociaal-
Economische Wetgeving, 632. See also, J.P.H. Donner, ‘Report of the Netherlands on 
Articles 30-36, in: Fédération internationale pour le droit européen’, Reports for the 
10th Congress. Consumer protection and the common market (FIDE, 1982). 
46  Gaudet to J.B.S. Edwards, 14 February 1966, BAC 492/1995 8. 
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Deringer’s written question was drafted against the backdrop of progress with 
the removal of customs and quantitative restrictions between the Member States. 
Deringer called on the Commission to clarify their understanding of the measures 
having equivalent effect in order to provide legal certainty for both national 
administrations and enterprises.47 However the timing of Deringer’s parliamentary 
question cannot be explained by reference to the end of the transition period alone. 
Both Deringer’s background and developments in German politics provide additional 
clues for this. Deringer was a Christian Democrat parliamentarian (1958-70) and a 
lawyer close to the Freiburg school of ordoliberalism. This school of thought 
originated in the interwar period and emphasised the importance of the state in 
providing a framework for competition. A distinguished expert on EC competition 
law, Deringer had been involved in the negotiations on Regulation 17/1962, which 
specified the rules for the implementation of the EC Treaty’s competition provisions 
(Articles 85 and 86).48 Like VerLoren van Theemat, the German lawyer was involved 
in both competition policymaking and the development of the free movement of 
goods, which shows that actors employed different strategies in the creation of the 
common market. While competition policy and the broader goal to protect 
competition in the common market from distortions facilitated market building 
through new regulatory activities at the European level, the Treaty articles on the free 
movement of goods provided a means to directly intervene in the legal spheres of the 
Member States by deregulation.  
However Deringer’s work for the common market project went beyond the 
community institutions. The German MEP participated in the meetings of the 
Fédération internationale pour le droit européen (FIDE), a pan-European association 
of lawyers created in Brussels in 1961. FIDE actively promoted European integration 
through law and both Michel Gaudet and Pieter VerLoren van Theemat were 
instrumental in establishing the European association. 49 Deringer, for his part, 
                                                             
47  Written question no. 118, PE 16.591/F, 8 December 1966, ibid. 
48  K. Seidel and L. Pace,’ The drafting and the role of regulation 17: a hard-
fought compromise’. in: K.K. Patel and H. Schweitzer (eds.) The historical 
foundations of EU competition law (Oxford University Press, 2013), 54-88, here 74-
75. 
49  A. Vauchez, L’Union par le droit. L’invention d’un programme institutionnel 
pour l’Europe, (Presses de Sciences Po, 2013); M. Rasmussen, ‘Establishing a 
Constitutional Practice: The Role of the European Law Associations’, in: W. Kaiser 
and J.-H. Meyer (eds.) Societal Actors in European Integration. Polity-Building and 
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contributed to a FIDE conference on the question of the ideal economic system to 
underpin a juridical system of free competition in 1966, for example.50 Finally, after 
returning to private practice, Deringer’s law firm, Deringer, Tessin, Herrmann & 
Sedemund, advised the German government in the aftermath of the Cassis de Dijon 
judgment.51 
Lastly, his European parliamentary question in December 1966 was arguably 
shaped by the simultaneous role Deringer fulfilled as a member of the German 
Bundestag. 1966 represented a turning point in German politics. Chancellor Ludwig 
Erhard – an economics professor associated with the ordoliberal camp, the first 
economics minister of the Federal Republic and the face of the German economic 
miracle – curiously failed on issues of economic and financial policy during his 
relatively brief tenure as a chancellor (1963-66). The inability to counteract stagnating 
growth and budget deficits threw the coalition government between Christian 
Democrats and Free Democrats into crisis and Erhard resigned, following the Free 
Democrats’ departure from the coalition on 27 October 1966 and the failure to pass 
the 1967 budget in the Bundestag.52 This crisis paved the way, for the first time since 
1933, for the Social Democratic Party to assume a role in government when they 
became the partner of the Christian Democrats in the ‘grand coalition’. Political 
change was accompanied by a reorientation of economic policy. Like Erhard, the new 
Social Democrat Economics Minister Karl Schiller had an academic background in 
economics. But unlike Erhard, Schiller introduced counter-cyclical spending, giving a 
greater role to financial policy and, more generally, the role of the state in the 
economy, and he promoted ‘concerted action’ between workers, employers and the 
state to overcome the slump in the German economy.53 Liberal economics gave way 
to Keynesian policies. Arved Deringer probably experienced these changes as a 
                                                             
Policy-Making, 1958-1992 (Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 173-197.  
50  Modèles de concurrence et réglementation des ententes dans le marché 
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51  Statement by the German government (Reg.nr. 95357), Deringer, Tessin, 
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52  Gerhard Schröder, ‘Das Ende einer Kanzlerschaft’, Die Welt, 1 December 
1966, translation into English by Allison Brown, retrieved from: 
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waning of power in the domestic framework, providing all the more reason to 
concentrate his efforts on the European level.  
Returning to the policy dimension, Deringer’s written question in late 1966 
provided the decisive input for the Commission to provide a definition through a new 
directive in this story of the measures of equivalent effect. A few days after 
Deringer’s written question Gaudet wrote to Béraud, cautioning his colleague at the 
Legal Service to treat the question with great care and asking Béraud to liaise with 
DG III in the matter.54 Béraud then took the lead in drafting the Commission’s 
response to the parliamentary question, which was published on 14 March 1967. The 
reply featured two main arguments initially developed by Béraud and Ehring. The 
first argument started from the observation that Article 30 defined the ‘measures’ with 
regard to their ‘effect’. It would therefore be impossible to provide a conclusive 
definition of the provision. Further, as the Court had not yet defined this Treaty 
provision, it would be necessary to evaluate the experiences of the Commission and, 
in particular, the directives already issued under Article 33/7, in order to identify what 
types of measures could fall under the provision, including, for example: rules 
favouring domestic products; measures resulting in higher fees for imported products 
or reducing their value; and measures indistinctly applicable to domestic and imported 
products, which, under certain conditions, impacted negatively only on imports.55 The 
assertion that in principle indistinctly applicable measures could constitute measures 
having equivalent effect represented the second argument, which featured in the 
Commission’s response to Deringer’s question.   
Deringer was not content with the Commission’s reply, however. The German 
MEP criticised the Commission’s approach to defining the measures having 
equivalent effect by providing an overview of different types of measures. According 
to Deringer this solution was inadequate as it failed to spell out the Commission’s 
underlying conception of the measures having equivalent effect to quantitative 
restrictions. Deringer therefore asked the Commission to clarify this point in a follow-
up question on 11 May 1967.56 In the ensuing debate the focus shifted from the issue 
of the appropriate approach to defining measures having equivalent effect to 
quantitative restrictions to the argument that indistinctly applicable measures could 
                                                             
54  Michel Gaudet, Note pour M. Béraud, 13 December 1966, BAC 492/1995 8. 
55  Béraud, Note pour M. Gaudet, 21 December 1966, ibid. 
56  Written question no. 64, ibid. 
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constitute measures having equivalent effect. This hotly contested issue changed the 
quality of the debate and introduced new voices into it including, most importantly, 
Pieter VerLoren van Theemat.  
The Commission’s reply to Deringer’s follow-up question originated in DG 
III, in close cooperation with the Legal Service,57 and began by reiterating the 
interpretation of the measures having equivalent effect articulated in the 
Commission’s initial reply. Accordingly, measures comprised:  
‘Laws, regulations, administrative provisions and practices hindering imports or 
exports, which could take place in the absence thereof, including those regulations 
and practices which make imports and exports more difficult or costly than the 
disposal of domestic production.’58  
 
This broad interpretation was followed by a formula narrowing down the scope of the 
Treaty provision significantly: ‘[I]t must be remembered that measures indistinctly 
applicable to imports and domestic products, for the most part, do not constitute 
measures having equivalent effect.’59 It is noteworthy that the phrase ‘for the most 
part’ meant that technically, indistinctly applicable measures could fall under the 
provision of Article 30. 
A note from Hubert Ehring to Michel Gaudet, written on 28 June 1967, just 
two days before the Commission released their official reply to the European 
Parliament, highlights the controversial nature of the formula. Ehring reports having 
learned that Guido Colonna di Paliano, the Commissioner for the Internal Market, had 
the section eliminated from the Commission’s reply, apparently with Gaudet’s 
approval. The German lawyer protested in the strongest possible terms against 
deleting the reference to indistinctly applicable measures. Ehring warned that leaving 
this section out would mean losing an important restriction on what could constitute 
measures having equivalent effect. The Commission would therefore confirm the 
wide interpretation of Article 30 proposed by Pieter VerLoren van Theemat.60  
The episode shows first that Ehring was aware of VerLoren van Theemat’s 
position before the Director-General for Competition published his interpretation of 
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58  Reply to written question no. 64, ibid. 
59  Ibid. Emphasis added.  
60  Hubert Ehring, Note à l’attention de Monsieur Gaudet, ibid. 
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measures having equivalent effect in late August 1967.61 This underlines informal 
consultations on Article 30 took place across Commission departments, very likely in 
the informal reflection group remembered by Alfonso Mattera. Second Ehring’s note 
suggests that DG III, supported by VerLoren van Theemat, favoured a wider 
interpretation of the scope of Article 30 than the Legal Service. There was therefore 
disagreement within the Commission, although, officially, the Commission spoke 
with one voice in their reply to Deringer. Finally, the controversial formula was 
reintroduced into the Commission’s reply, which can be regarded as a reflection of 
the influence of the Legal Service, possibly of Michel Gaudet, the addressee of 
Ehring’s warning.  
In conclusion, the ideational foundations for what was to become Directive 
70/50 were developed during the second period of policymaking. On the one hand, 
this concerned the notion that it was impossible to provide the conclusive definition 
for the measures having equivalent effect, precisely because the ‘effect’ of measures 
needed to be established. This recognition required developing a pragmatic approach 
and drawing on the concrete experiences of the Commission in defining Article 30. 
Article 2 of Directive 70/50 reflects this argument by enumerating examples of 
measures covered by the Treaty provision. On the other hand, the distinction into 
distinctly and indistinctly applicable measures was there to stay. Not only did lawyers 
in European institutions disagree on the scope of indistinctly applicable measures in 
particular, but it also shaped the structure of Directive 70/50. Article 2 provided for a 
general prohibition of distinctly applicable measures and Article 3 for the prohibition 
of certain indistinctly applicable measures. The specific conditions for indistinctly 
applicable measures to qualify as measures having equivalent effect to quantitative 
restrictions however were only developed in the third period of policymaking.  
 
III. 3 The making of Directive 70/50 
(1968-69) 
The third and final period of policymaking can be dated from 11 March 1968, when 
René-Christian Béraud presented at a conference organised by the Paris Bar and the 
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Association des Juristes européens, the French branch of FIDE. This presentation, 
entitled ‘Les mesures d’effet équivalent aus sens des articles 30 et suivants du Traité 
de Rome’, was subsequently published in the Revue trimestrielle du droit Européen 
and established Béraud as the authority on Directive 70/50 in the Commission and the 
legal community.62 The first part of the paper provides a systematic discussion of 
different types of measures having equivalent effect to quantitative restrictions as the 
basis for deducting a general doctrine of the Treaty provision. This doctrine is 
developed in the second part of the article. The first of three points proposed here is 
that only state measures can qualify as measures having equivalent effect. Second 
since measures need to have the same effect as quantitative restrictions the provision 
also includes measures other than those discriminating between imports and domestic 
goods. The third point deals with limitations and exceptions to the doctrine. For our 
story, this is the most interesting part of the paper, as it discusses which indistinctly 
applicable measures would be covered by the Treaty provision.63  
Béraud highlights that indistinctly applicable measures are, in principle, not 
measures having equivalent effect, very much in line with the formula, which was 
reinserted in the last minute into the Commission’s reply to Deringer’s second 
parliamentary question. But this definition also means that certain indistinctly 
applicable measures are covered by the prohibition of Article 30. The challenge 
therefore is figuring out which ones. According to Béraud a conflict between the 
prohibition of the measures having equivalent effect and the freedom of the Member 
States to regulate trade needed resolving. Béraud then proceeds to reject VerLoren 
van Theemat’s thesis that measures enacted by the Member States could only be 
upheld when falling within the scope of Article 36. Instead the French lawyer 
proposes applying the abuse principle (la notion d’ «abus de droit»), known from 
French and German law in particular, to draw the boundaries between the 
competences of Community and the Member States.  
‘Indeed the right to regulate trade somehow neutralises the principle of the prohibition 
of the measures having equivalent effect… This right finds its limits in its very 
foundations, its raison d’être. This has two consequences, the first of which is that 
this right can only be used to meet the objectives for which it has been developed in 
our states, namely public security, public order, but also quality, standardisation of 
                                                             
62  See Béraud, Les mesures d’effet équivalent (supra note 28) and BAC 
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63  Béraud, Les mesures d’effet équivalent, 287-291. The following section draws 
on these pages. 
 20 
 
products… The second consequence is that the regulation be both necessary and 
sufficient or, if we want, effective and not excessive for this purpose. A Member State 
using this right outside these limits by hindering imports more than the domestic 
production would in fact pursue the same objective as the introduction of a quota.’64  
 
Thus it can be seen that this section of Béraud’s argument is crucial as it provides the 
basis for introducing the principle of proportionality into Directive 70/50. It was only 
a small step from arguing measures enacted by Member States should ‘not be 
excessive for this purpose’ to the language of Article 3, which prohibits indistinctly 
applicable measures where ‘the restrictive effects on the free movement of goods are 
out of proportion to their purpose.’ The doctrine of proportionality not only features 
in Directive 70/50 however. Proportionality provided the basis for what became 
known as the ‘Cassis test’ – an assessment of the lawfulness of trade barriers resulting 
from the diversity of national rules.  
 The Commission’s approach to indistinctly applicable measures also stirred 
debate in the negotiations on the draft directive in 1969. Officials in DG III and the 
Legal Service had developed the directive between April and July 1969.65 On 9 and 
30 June 1969 Commission officials and experts from the Member States discussed the 
draft directive in a meeting of the special working group. The revised draft was then 
presented to the Member States, all of which, except France, agreed on the 
desirability of issuing a directive. The Commission prevailed over the protest of the 
French permanent representative, articulated in a letter of 30 October 1969, however, 
arguing it was necessary to provide for legal certainty at the end of the transition 
period. Returning to Article 3 of the draft directive, the Commission’s approach to 
indistinctly applicable measures was approved by Italy and the Benelux countries but 
challenged by Germany and France who objected to the argument that indistinctly 
applicable measures could constitute measures having equivalent effect. The German 
delegation in particular wanted to delete Article 3 and argued that the measures of 
Article 30 applied only to measures discriminating against imported products – a 
proposition Commission officials could refute with arguments developed by Béraud 
in his 1968 article.  
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But why did Germany and France oppose the Commission’s reading that 
Article 30 covered certain indistinctly applicable measures? A precise analysis of 
their resistance to the Commission’s position would require further research in 
German and French governmental archives. However, that the EC Treaty had 
something to say on the validity of rules concerning nationally produced goods posed 
a potential threat to the autonomy of the Member States in socio-economic policy. In 
Germany, the years between the 1967 recession and the first oil shock were dedicated 
to expanding the Keynesian welfare state.66 It is unlikely therefore that Karl Schiller’s 
Economics Ministry would have easily agreed to give up powers for steering the 
German economy, even more so, since the 1969 federal elections consolidated Social 
Democratic power and brought in the first social-liberal coalition government under 
the new Chancellor Willy Brandt. France, in turn, was dealing with the repercussions 
of May 1968, which had considerably weakened President Charles De Gaulle, 
ultimately leading to his resignation in April 1969. But May 68 also shook the French 
economy turning the country’s positive commercial balance in 1967 into a strongly 
negative one in 1968. France lost almost a third of its gold reserves and the franc was 
significantly weakened. The resulting balance-of-payment problems made the 
potential transfer of socio-economic powers to the European level an implausible 
policy option.67 
Finally, returning to the drafting of the directive, it is not possible to establish 
the precise authorship of the directive and its different parts; only a few names appear 
in the archival records. Not surprisingly Béraud is one of them; another one is 
Heinrich Matthies who later represented the European Commission in the Cassis de 
Dijon case. What is clear however is that: (a) between 1966 and 1969, a small group 
of lawyers and civil servants in DG III and the Legal Service established the 
ideational foundations for Cassis de Dijon; and (b) important personal continuities 
existed from the initial debate on the Commission directive to the time of the Cassis 
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de Dijon decision. The following section addresses the link between policymaking on 
Directive 70/50 and the Court’s jurisprudence by focusing on the mobilisation of the 
directive in Dassonville, a key building block of the European economic constitution.  
 
III.4 Directive 70/50 and the European Court of Justice  
(1970-74)   
The primacy of the jurisprudence of the ECJ means that the Court is not bound by a 
Commission directive. However Directive 70/50 was first mobilised in Dassonville in 
the written submission to the Court by the plaintiff’s lawyer, Roger Strowel. The 
Dassonville case originated, when the Belgian Public Prosecutor initiated proceedings 
against French trader, Gustave Dassonville and his son Benoît, who managed a 
branch of his father’s business in Belgium. The Dassonvilles offered ‘Scotch whisky’ 
of the brands Johnny Walker and Vat 69 for sale in Belgium without however being 
able to produce the certificates of origin of the goods issued by the British authorities 
(the country of origin of Scotch whisky). Belgian law stipulated (a) that the 
recognition of a designation of origin would be subject to a declaration by the 
government concerned to the Belgian government that this designation of origin was 
‘officially and definitely adopted’.68 (b) The import and sale of spirits with a 
designation of origin duly adopted by the Belgian government would be prohibited if 
these spirits were not accompanied by any official document certifying their right to 
this designation. If the Dassonvilles were found in violation of Belgian law they could 
face imprisonment, amongst other penalties.  
Notably, Gustave Dassonville had not purchased the bottles, which were to be 
offered by his son for sale in Belgium, directly from the British producers of Scotch 
whisky. The goods were purchased from the French importers and distributors of 
Johnny Walker and Vat 69. Crucially, therefore, the bottles had already been imported 
into a Member State of the community. In contrast to Belgium, however, France did 
not require a certificate of origin for Scotch whisky. When they prepared the bottles 
for the import (from France) into Belgium and for the sale in Belgium, the 
Dassonvilles only affixed labels bearing the words ‘British customs certificate of 
origin’ on the bottles and noted the information on the French excise bond (the 
official document required by France to accompany a designation of origin) on the 
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permit register. In the eyes of the Public Prosecutor, this procedure constituted 
forgery and a violation of Belgian law.  
Strowel addressed the incompatibility of Belgian law and the Treaty’s 
prohibition of measures having equivalent effect arguing that the Belgian law in 
question ‘…renders impossible imports into Belgium from any country other than that 
in which the goods originate, in the case where the country concerned has no rules 
similar to those operating in Belgium with regard to certificates of origin.’69 This 
would amount to discrimination, or a disguised restriction of trade between the 
Member States, which was not covered by Article 36. Moreover, Strowel’s original 
written submission to the ECJ included an important reference to Directive 70/50, 
which did not make it in full into the ‘Summary of written observations’ published by 
the Court.70 The lawyer referred to the directive arguing that:  
‘…a restriction [i.e. a certificate of originality] is never legitimate if its goal can be 
achieved just as well by other means impeding less on trade; or if the restrictive 
effects on the free movement of goods resulting from the regulation are out of 
proportion to its purpose.’71  
 
Strowel therefore resorted to the important principle of proportionality to support the 
argument that Belgian law was in violation of Article 30. The Commission, 
represented by Béraud, supported Strowel in their written statement to the Court. 
Advocate-General Trabucchi who played a fundamental role in crafting the 
Van Gend en Loos decision a decade earlier also discussed Directive 70/50 in his 
opinion to the Court. It is perhaps not surprising that Trabucchi sided with the 
Dassonvilles and the Commission, when he advised the ECJ that:  
‘The prohibition on importation into a Member State of foreign products bearing a 
protected designation of origin and already in free circulation in another Member 
State, imposed on the sole ground of inability to produce the certificate of origin, 
constitutes a measure having an effect equivalent to a quantitative restriction 
prohibited in principle by Article 30 of the EEC Treaty and not admissible on the 
basis of Article 36.’72  
 
In its judgment of 11 July 1974 the ECJ followed Trabucchi holding that:  
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‘…the requirement by a Member State of a certificate of authenticity which is less 
easily obtainable by importers of an authentic product which has been put into free 
circulation in a regular manner in another Member State than by importers of the 
same product coming directly from the country of origin constitutes a measure having 
an effect equivalent to a quantitative restriction as prohibited by the Treaty.’73 
 
More important for the argument of the European economic constitution and 
arguably, the wider future jurisprudence, however, the ECJ linked this precise 
response to the question before it – the question if the requirement of a certificate of 
origin constituted a violation of the prohibition of measures having equivalent effect – 
to a comprehensive definition of measures having equivalent effect in the Court’s 
‘most famous pronouncement ever’74: ‘All trading rules enacted by Member States 
which are capable of hindering, directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, intra-
Community trade are to be considered as measures having an effect equivalent to 
quantitative restrictions.’75 This means that the ECJ did not follow the approach 
promoted by the Commission in Directive 70/50, namely to enumerate a number of 
concrete cases in which equally applicable measures could breach the prohibition of 
Article 30.76 Instead it went further – further than Trabucchi’s opinion, too – so that 
its all-embracing definition of measures having equivalent effect put the ECJ in close 
proximity to legal scholars favouring an extensive reading of the provision, as argued 
specifically in Pieter VerLoren van Theemat’s 1967 article.  
At the same time the Court held that under certain circumstances and in the 
‘absence of a Community system’, Member States could take measures to prevent 
unfair practices as long as these measures were ‘reasonable’ and ‘the means of proof 
required’ would ‘not act as a hindrance to trade between Member States and … in 
consequence, [would] be accessible to all Community nationals.’77 Taking on board 
the argument proposed by Roger Strowel the Court continued:  
‘Even without having to examine whether or not such measures are covered by 
Article 36, they must not, in any case, by virtue of the principle expressed in the 
second sentence of that Article, constitute a means of arbitrary discrimination or a 
disguised restriction on trade between Member States.’78  
 
                                                             
73  Ibid. 852. 
74  Weiler, The Constitution of the Common Market Place, 353.  
75  Case 8/74, 852.   
76  Carney, What Rule of Reason?, 311-312. 
77  Case 8/74, 852. 
78  Ibid. 
 25 
 
This part of the judgment was interpreted as the basis for a ‘rule of reason’ approach, 
which the ECJ developed in its Cassis de Dijon judgment.79 In Cassis de Dijon the 
Court therefore developed from, and went further than Dassonville and other case law 
in (implicitly) introducing a ‘rule of reason’ approach. This part of the judgment has 
been subject of much criticism from the legal community for creating legal 
uncertainty and for giving way to a contradictory body of case law.80  
 
IV Conclusions  
The archive- and actor-based approach of this article has highlighted first that there 
was a strong continuity in the investment by a small number of key actors in focusing 
on Article 30 to create the single market from 1966. Béraud, Mattera, Deringer and 
lastly, Matthies, were intimately involved in the making of Directive 70/50 and at 
least one of the two landmark cases on the measures having equivalent effect, 
Dassonville and Cassis de Dijon.  
Second, the focus on key actors and the ideas they developed alerts us to the 
fluid boundaries between politics and the law. The second period of policymaking in 
particular (discussed in section III.2) shows a pendulum between the debate in the 
legal community and political impetus, epitomised by the interventions of MEP 
Deringer, which crucially advanced this debate.   
Moreover, and this is the third conclusion that this archive- and actor-based 
approach made it possible to trace the missing policy dimension of the origins of 
Cassis de Dijon. The focus on a small number of key actors and the ideas and legal 
arguments they mobilised has shown the fluidity of boundaries between policymaking 
and jurisprudence. This is not to contradict the theory of the hierarchy of laws. Instead 
the argument here is that ideas and legal concepts are generated and distributed aside 
of this hierarchy. The notion of distinctly and indistinctly applicable measures, on the 
one hand, and the principle of proportionality, on the other, support this point.  
Finally, and following from the previous arguments, the findings of this article 
change the picture we get of the ECJ in building the European economic constitution. 
This examination of the policy origins of the jurisprudence of the Court has shown 
how the ECJ’s activities were embedded in the attempts of a wider legal community 
to advance the creation of the common market. This view is in line with the 
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demystification of the Court and its jurisprudence by showing the political nature of 
interpreting the law, which scholars from Alter and Meunier to the more recent ‘new 
history of EU law’ have been undertaking for a number of years.  
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